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Business Opportunities In Japan
By HAL G. NIELSEN
B.S., Sophia Universiy, Tokyo, 1962,,..D., Lincoln Uniersriy, 1977, assod-
ated with Fleisler, Dubb, Meyer & Lovejoy, San Francisco
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years the acknowledged position of the Japanese government
was to protect its domestic markets from foreign incursions. Referred
to as the "hot house" strategy, the government protected its domestic
industries from foreign competition until they were strong enough to
fend for themselves.
United States firms seeking to penetrate the Japanese market met with
numerous overt and covert government restrictive policies, a hostile at-
titude by Japanese industry and a xenophobic public mentality. In ad-
dition, unfamiliar Japanese business practices, interlocking company
ties, a language difficult to master, a lack of information, a complex
distribution system and a fierce domestic market were conditions which
kept all but the strongest and most adventurous U.S. companies out of
the Japanese domestic market.
Nor was there any need, until recently, for U.S. businesses to risk fail-
ure in Japan's unfamiliar environment. The U.S. market was big
enough. Exporting, offshore manufacturing and marketing were exotic
concepts and were not considered worth the effort by most U.S.
businesses.
Two developments changed all that: the highly visible Japanese inva-
sion and capture of U.S. markets in steel, cameras, autos and consumer
electronic products, and the global economic downturn that followed
the 1973 oil crisis. As a result, U.S. businesses looked to the long-
closed Japanese markets. They began to petition the United States
government for changes. The government reacted in a number of
ways. Pressure was put on the Japanese to restrict their U.S. exports
under threat of import restrictions, local-content bills were passed and
quotas were imposed. The United States Government pressed the Jap-
anese to open their markets to American products and investments.
The Japanese reacted in classic Japanese fashion. Rather than meet
the pressure head on, they tempered it. Bamboo is an ancient Japanese
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building material. It has great resiliency. It bends and sways with the
wind unlike stronger materials, such as iron, that remain rigid until
they reach the breaking point and snap. Similarly the Japanese ac-
cepted the criticism launched against them, patiently listened to the
American view and asked for "time to study the matter." Each meet-
ing by a joint-study team, each visit by a head of state and each change
of government was usually followed by some concession on the Japa-
nese side. Slowly and grudgingly they opened their markets to foreign-
ers. The markets were opened too fast for some domestic Japanese
interests and not fast enough for some U.S. interests.
The liberalization effort by the Japanese government, allowing a cer-
tain internationalization of the economy and increased understanding
of Westerners by the Japanese, has produced results. Currently the
Japanese market is relatively free of governmentally imposed entry re-
strictions. Still, in the minds of many, Japan remains a closed market.
An exhaustive study prepared in 1983 for the United States-Japan
Trade Study Group by McKinsey & Co., a leading U.S. business con-
sulting firm, reveals many facts and misconceptions about the Japanese
market but reaches the following conclusion: "Japan is indeed a diffi-
cult market, but it is hardly a closed or controlled one. In fact, it is
probably one of the most fiercely competitive economies in the world.
There are some very real restrictions facing foreigners, but these ironi-
cally are less than in some Western countries."'
Americans may be surprised to learn that the amount of direct invest-
ment by U.S. firms in Japan is greater than that of Japanese firms in
the United States. The McKinsey study points out that the return on
assets among foreign firms in Japan was better than that of their Japa-
nese counterparts. Yet despite the potential and proven profits, the
U.S. direct investment in Japan was the same as it was in Belgium-
which has a gross national product about one-tenth the size of Japan's.
What follows is an examination of how changes in Japanese laws, gov-
ernment policies and attitudes have made Japan more receptive to U.S.
exports and investments. This Outline will examine the liberalization
of the "Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Law," the lending poli-
cies of the Japan Development Bank in assisting foreign firms, the op-
portunities for U.S. firms to participate in Nippon Telegraph &
Telephone Company's multibillion dollar procurement and the aggres-
sive efforts by the central and local governments to attract foreign in-
1. McKINsEY & Co., JAPAN BUSINESS: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES (prepared
for the United States-Japan Trade Study Group, 1983) [hereinafter cited as the McKINsnY
study].
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vestments to Japan. Finally, this Outline will examine the types of U.S.
products and services that represent good prospects for entry into the
Japanese market, and how they should be introduced.
II. FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND TRADE CONTROL
A. History of Foreign Investment and Trade Control Laws
For several decades following World War H, foreign exchange
transactions in Japan were kept on a tight rein by the central
government. With the scarcity of foreign exchange that then
existed, one would have thought that the government would have
welcomed an influx of outside capital. That, however, was not the
case. Direct investments by foreign firms were heavily regulated.
The government remained intransigent in the face of U.S.
entreaties to relax those controls, and kept a close watch over
foreign investments. These strict government controls remained in
effect until the early 1970's.
Beginning in the 1970's limited foreign capital inflows were
permitted. This usually took the form of loans arranged by the
government through international financial institutions such as the
World Bank. The reason given for the continued restrictions was a
desire to control the national debt. The government claimed that
this debt would be a burden on the nation should the economy
experience a significant downturn. That line of reasoning,
however, did not explain why direct foreign investments of equity
capital were so tightly controlled. The real reason for those
restrictions, as expressed by foreigners, was to prevent too much
foreign control of domestic production assets.
The most comprehensive law affecting foreign investment in Japan
was, and still is, the "Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law"2 (hereinafter cited as "Foreign Control Law").
When first enacted, it purported to be a temporary post-war
reconstruction measure aimed at protecting Japanese industries
devastated by World War II. The Foreign Control Law regulated
virtually all foreign exchange and trade transactions. It required
prior approval or licensing from the appropriate Japanese
governmental agency unless the intended activity was specifically
exempted from control by the Foreign Control Law itself or its
subordinate regulations. There were few such exemptions.
Procedures for obtaining the necessary government approvals were
2. Law No. 228 of 1949 (effective Dec. 1, 1949).
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contained in various ministerial ordinances promulgated by the
Ministry of Finance.
Like most Japanese laws, the Foreign Control Law gave wide
discretion to the operating officials. The Japanese legislature
traditionally passes laws drafted in broad general language and
leaves it up to the bureaucracy to interpret those laws under the
principle of "administrative guidance." There is no established
"right" of appeal against an unfavorable ruling, and bureaucrats
generally do not have to explain their actions. The dominant
aspect of the Foreign Control Law was the strict necessity for prior
government approval before a foreign firm could establish a
business or otherwise invest in Japan.
Operating in tandem with the Foreign Control Law was the "Law
Concerning Foreign Investment ' 3 (hereinafter cited as the
"Foreign Investment Law"). This law purported to encourage
foreign investments and to have as its goal the gradual relaxation
of all controls until full liberalization was achieved. The Foreign
Investment Law set up positive and negative guidelines to be met
by foreign firms seeking approval of transactions under its
controls. Despite its announced purpose, the law actually made it
more difficult for foreigners to do business in Japan.
The Foreign Investment Law created a two-tier approval system
which caused confusion and uncertainty for the U.S. businesses.
An application for the introduction of capital or technology which
by its terms exceeded one year was controlled by the Foreign
Investment Law. The Foreign Control Law governed similar
activities if the term was less than one year. Changes in both laws
were made by a series of cabinet orders issued by the Executive
Branch, or by ministerial ordinances issued by the Ministry of
Finance, rather than by amendment of the basic laws themselves.
It was also difficult to get a clear answer from the bureaucracy why
a particular application to do business was approved or rejected.
Generally only joint-ventures involving transfer or licensing of
U.S. technology to Japanese companies were approved. Foreign
capital investment in any joint-venture was limited to 50%. In
1973 a policy allowing 100% foreign investment was adopted in
principle, but there were significant limitations with prior approval
being the most onerous. Few, if any, wholly-owned foreign
subsidiaries were approved. Additionally, only such foreign
3. Law No. 163 of 1950.
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investments were approved as the administrating officials believed
benefited the Japanese economy, or at a minimum aided the
particular Japanese partner involved. Since practically the only
means of investment open to U.S. firms was the 50/50 joint-
venture, many "shotgun" marriages were formed which in time
proved unsatisfactory to both parties. One U.S. lawyer practicing
in Tokyo stated that for the first six months after the current
liberalization amendment4 was passed, he spent virtually all his
time unwinding pre-liberalization joint-ventures.
In 1956 a cabinet order was promulgated authorizing "Yen-Based
Companies. ' 5 This was announced as a major liberalization
measure. Its "liberalization" value was, however, questionable. It
permitted foreign firms to acquire newly issued stock of Japanese
firms by purchasing shares with Japanese yen legally converted
from designated hard foreign currencies. There were other
restrictions which effectively prevented any large-scale investment
by foreign companies. The scheme was finally abandoned in 1964
under pressure from the United States Government. But rather
than instituting a genuine liberalization measure, the Japanese
government forced U.S. companies that had qualified under the
Yen-Base provisions to reapply for approval under the foreign
control and investment laws as had been previously required.
Pressure from the United States continued to build for complete
liberalization rather than piece-meal, token measures.
Throughout, the intractable nature of the administering Japanese
bureaucracies continued to puzzle or irritate U.S. businesses.
Faced with the unpleasant task of disapproving a controversial
application, the bureaucracy simply stalled. Applications
languished in government offices with no action taken one way or
another. Many applicants simply gave up in disgust.
The experience of Yale & Towne is illustrative of the problem. In
1964 this U.S. lock manufacturer filed a request with the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to establish a wholly-
owned subsidiary in Japan. No action was taken. MITI sat on the
application until Yale & Towne finally withdrew it in 1975, nine
years after the initial filing. Unaccustomed to this passive
resistance American businessmen became angry or frustrated. "I
4. See infra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
5. Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1956 (Cabinet Order Pertaining to the Standards for
Validating Foreign Investments Act of 1950).
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wish they would give me a 'yes, no or go to hell,' "was the way one
involved party expressed himself.
Slowly the Japanese government began to give way under foreign
pressure, mostly from the United States, for complete
liberalization. The first significant liberalization measure was
announced in July 1967 after lengthy meetings between the United
States and Japanese governments. Thereafter a series of such
meetings was held and the strict controls were gradually relaxed
until finally a major amendment to the "Foreign Control Law"
was passed in December 1979.6 This amendment became effective
in December 1980. It substantially relaxed government control
over foreign investments and opened the Japanese market to U.S.
interests.
B. Characteristics of the 1980 Amendment
The amendment abolished the Foreign Investment Law and
effectively brought all foreign investment and international
economic activities of, or with, Japan under one law: the Foreign
Control Law. More importantly, it shifted from the principle of
"prior approval" to the principle of "notice after the fact."
The basic changes in the "Foreign Control Law" can be
summarized as follows:
1. The amendment provides a notice requirement under which
foreign investors are only required to file notice with the
appropriate agency of their intention to invest in Japan;
2. The amendment makes government approval "automatic"
unless the application is affirmatively disapproved within a
short period prescribed by the law.
The Japanese government explained the new law in the following
way: "From a legal viewpoint, the Foreign Exchange Control Law
was amended in 1980 to introduce the concept of "free in
principle" under which investors are only required to report their
planned investment instead of applying for [prior] approval [as]
under the previous system."7
C. Effects of the 1980 Amendment
It is difficult to establish a direct cause and effect relationship
between liberalization and foreign investment in every case, but
the trend is clear. According to MITI
[tihe number of foreign enterprises moving into the
6. Law No. 65 of 1979 (effective Dec. 1980).
7. STUY GROUP FOR DiREcT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN JAPAN, REPORT (Aug. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as STUDY GROUP REPORT].
[Vol. 7
Business Opportunities in Japan
Japanese market has been on the rise in recent years,
centering around fast growth sectors such as machinery
and chemical industries, with American firms leading.
Foreign investment in Japan during the fiscal year (FY)
19828 recorded an all-time high of $749 million, bringing
the cumulative total to $4.161 billion as of the end of FY
1982. About 2,400 foreign-affiliated firms were operating
in Japan as of the end of FY 1982. There are among
them a number of firms that hold the largest share of the
local market, who enjoy a leading position in the
industries concerned. Thus, foreign-affiliated firms in
Japan are definitely playing a substantial role in
Japanese economy.9
The manufacturing industry accounts for 75% of the capital
invested by foreign enterprises, and the United States leads all
foreign investor nations with 60% of the total foreign-affiliates
operating in Japan. At present 20% of the foreign-affiliated
manufacturing companies are wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries.
The general trend is toward a larger proportional share of foreign
equity in foreign affiliates.
Experts on Japanese trade and commercial matters generally
credit the 1980 Amendment with liberalizing both the law and
Japanese attitudes toward foreign investment. "The 1980 Foreign
Exchange Law was more than simply a domestic change. The
capital outflows and increased activity in foreign exchange and
capital markets that have occurred since the law was enacted
demonstrate that the change is having genuine consequences on
Japan's international financial transactions."'"
An exhaustive study of the implications for United States-Japan
trade and investment was conducted by the Hudson Institute."
The final report cites four major consequences of the law that
positively fosters increased opportunities for U.S. businesses in
Japan:
1. The law has had the effect of bringing together conflicting
domestic interests of different groups in Japan. The Ministry
8. Japanese fiscal year is from April 1st to March 31st.
9. INDUS. LOCATION GUIDANCE DIVISION, MITI, REPORT. INDUSTRIAL INVES"TENT
IN JAPAN (Oct. 1983).
10. See Law No. 65 supra note 6.
11. HUDSON INSTITUTE, INC., JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN THE
1980's: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT (Oct. 1982).
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of Finance and the Bank of Japan are examples. As one U.S.
businessperson states, "[flor the first time these guys are
singing from the same sheet of music."
2. The law will have the effect of further increasing the trend
toward internationalization of the yen. This can be seen in the
enlightened attitude taken by the Japan Development Bank.
3. The law will affect the efficiency of the capital market.
Japanese firms will no longer be able to take advantage of open
capital markets in other countries while limiting foreigners'
access to Japanese capital markets. Japanese interest rates are
significantly lower than world interest rates. Foreign
businesses will now be able to make use of Japanese loan
sources.
4. There has been a pent-up domestic demand for foreign assets
caused by the Japanese government's restrictive policies. Now
that capital liberalization has occurred, this demand is being
released. The charge that Japan has been using a controlled
capital market to maintain an artificially low exchange rate
(and thus promote exports) will no longer be valid.
The only areas still statutorily closed to direct foreign investments
are agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, petroleum, leather and
leather products manufacturing, and industries pertaining to
national security and public order. Everything else has been
liberalized. In the opening pages of its report, the Study Group for
Direct Foreign Investment in Japan stated, "[t]he first thing we
want foreign investors to know is the fact that Japan is by no
means negative toward foreign investment but positively welcomes
it." 12
Ill. JAPAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
A. Background
The Japan Development Bank (the Bank) is a wholly-owned
government financial institution established in April 1951 under
the provisions of the Japan Development Bank Law. 13 Its basic
lending policy has always reflected changes in government policy.
The cabinet prepares a basic lending policy for the Bank each
fiscal year. Its loans are made only to government targeted sectors
12. See STUDY GROUP REPORT supra note 7.
13. LOAN DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, JAPAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
INTRODUCING THE JAPAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (1982).
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and industries. Its major international funding source is the
issuance of foreign bonds and notes. Like other Japanese lending
institutions, the Bank practices "window guidance," a Japanese
euphemism for making sure the Bank's practices are in keeping
with the prevailing government policy. A decision to finance a
particular project is based on that project's contribution to the
implementation of government policy.
The Bank's lending terms are very attractive. Funds are provided
for capital investments such as the purchase of land, buildings and
equipment. There is no limit on the loan amount, and the loans
can cover as much as 50% of the total investment costs. There is a
grace period granted during any construction period. Loans are
denominated in yen. The interest rate is fixed and is the same as
the long-term prime rate set by Japan's leading long-term credit
and trust banks. Rates as low as 7.3 percent per annum are
available. The Bank will also cooperate with private banks and
lending institutions to co-finance large projects.
B. Funds Made Available to U.S. Businesses
In the 1960's the Bank had been making some loans to foreign-
affiliated Japanese companies, but the amounts were small and
heavily restricted. Not many foreign businesspersons were even
aware that such loans were available. Fewer yet had the patience
and stamina to apply for such loans and pursue their application
through to fruition. Then came a shift in government attitude.
The Bank announced that "[b]eginning in fiscal 1983, the Bank
will actively assist foreign-owned companies investing in Japan
from the standpoint of furthering international industrial
cooperation."' 4
In December 1983 the Bank announced the first such subsidized
loan to a foreign-owned firm, Applied Materials of Santa Clara,
California, a semiconductor equipment producer. Applied
Materials received a $3.4 million loan to build a factory and
research center at Narita, located just outside Tokyo. The loan
was granted despite the fact that Applied Materials competes
directly with Japanese companies in the same line of business in
Japan. Viewed from all angles the loan represented a significant
departure from the Japanese government's previous domestic
industry protective stance.
The final arrangements were made after nearly a year of
14. Id.
1984)
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negotiations. Gary Robertson, Treasurer of Applied Materials,
said "[w]e have not seen any obstacles being placed in people's
paths. I think that many companies that have tried to get into the
Japanese market have not been patient enough."' 5 Applied
Materials had reason to be pleased - $2.3 million of the $3.4
million loan was granted at an interest rate of 7.3 percent, with the
remainder at 8.2 percent.
IV. NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
CORPORATION (NTT)
A. Background
The Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) is a
wholly-owned government monopoly responsible for the
procurement of all communications equipment used in Japan,
NTT's purchases are estimated at $3.2 billion annually. Until
1981 no significant purchases were made from foreign firms.
Domestic procurement was limited to a few chosen companies
referred to as the "Den-den family," consisting primarily of
Fujitsu, Hitachi, Nippon Electric and Oki Electric. So exclusive
was this family that even other well-known Japanese companies
such as Sony, Matsushita (Panasonic) and Toshiba were unable to
obtain any significant amount of procurement business from NTT.
Legally NTT is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications, but in point of fact it functions as an
independent entity almost totally ignoring the Ministry's legal
supervisory position. So independently does NTT operate that the
Ministry has trouble finding jobs for its retiring bureaucrats at
NTT. The assurance of industry jobs for retired ministry
personnel is a privilege traditionally enjoyed in all Japanese
bureaucracies. The arrangement fosters a symbiotic relationship
between a particular ministry and the industries it controls. Few
would be so bold as to rebuff a request by a government agency to
allow a retiring official to join its ranks.
Under increasing domestic pressure at home to open up its
procurement to companies outside of the Den-den family, NTT
came under still more pressure from the United States to allow
participation by U.S. firms. Beginning with the Tokyo round of
multilateral trade negotiations in 1978 and 1979, NTT soon
became the symbol of a closed market. A series of high level
15. San Francisco Exam., Dec. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
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intergovernmental meetings were held. They were emotionally
charged and given to acrimonious accusations and counter-
accusations. At one point NTT's President, Tokuji Akikusa, was
widely reported, perhaps incorrectly, to have said, "The only thing
NTT will buy from the U.S. is mops and buckets."
B. NIT Opens Its Procurement to U.S. Companies
NTT had such influence and political clout that it could almost
defy the Japanese government and the Post and
Telecommunications Ministry officials. It took tremendous effort
and political pressure to force NTT to open its procurement to
non-Japanese suppliers. Finally in December 1980 an agreement
was reached. NTT introduced new procurement procedures in
compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's
(GATT) code on government procurement and a supplemental
United States-Japan Agreement. For the first time, NTT
procurement was technically open to U.S. firms, effective January
1981. This agreement was to be for an initial trial period of three
years, ending December 31, 1983.
When the initial three year term came to an end, the parties
decided to extend the agreement through March 1984. Then a
significant development took place. In July 1984 three
telecommunications bills reorganizing NTT passed the lower
house of the Japanese Diet. The highlight of the bills is that
effective April 1985, up to 50% of NTT will become privately
owned. The new reconstructed NTT will be granted "a free hand"
in doing business. 6
C. Lack of Interest by U.S. Businesses
Attempts by U.S. businesses to sell to NTT have been
disappointing despite the fact that the barriers are down. This
presents quite an anomolous situation. After protesting so
strenuously about NTT's closed door policy, U.S. companies seem
generally disinterested now that the door is open. The American
Chamber of Commerce of Japan, long a critic of Japanese
impediments to trade, now finds itself criticizing American
companies for not taking advantage of the opportunities available
to them. A statement by the Chamber, made in a different context,
but equally applicable to NTT, says:
16. April 1985 Deregulation of Telecom Busine.r Certain, JAPAN ECON. J., July 24, 1984.
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[a]ny American company that thinks it "deserves" a share of the
Japanese market simply because it is an American company, is
barking up the wrong tree. That, sad to say, is the attitude held
by all too many Americans both within and without the govern-
ment when it comes to Japan.'
7
For its part, NTT seems to have taken all reasonable steps to make
it easy for U.S. firms to sell to NTT. In January 1981, in what has
been described as a "changing of the old guard," Dr. Hisashi
Shinto, the highly respected former president of Ishikawajima-
Harima Heavy Industry, was appointed NTT president. Widely
acclaimed as the doyen of Japanese businessmen, Dr. Shinto did
not come up through the NTT ranks and is not part of their "old
boy" network. He moved positively to implement the govern-
ment's internationalization policy. He has been given "high marks
for combating an [NTT] allergy to foreigners."
' 18
Dr. Shinto has made a change at NTT. He is on record as wanting
more foreign participation. He has travelled to the United States
and used his personal influence to encourage greater foreign parti-
cipation. He is presently considering dividing NTT into several in-
dependent and private organizations to make it less of a
bureaucratic conglomerate. At his direction, NTT's procurement
procedures are being widely published and distributed in English.
NTT has sponsored several high level and working level seminars
in the United States. A permanent public relations office, estab-
lished in New York, sends out regular mailings on NTT activities
and a new office was recently opened in Los Altos, California, near
the "Silicon Valley." The U.S. House Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications along with the Department of Commerce recently
sponsored a series of congressional workshops on NTT procure-
ment. More importantly, Dr. Shinto's policies have filtered down
to the operational level where the day-to-day decisions are made.
Nevertheless, U.S. corporate executives remain skeptical about
NTT's intentions. Many contend that NTT is merely "going
through the motions" and, though they will make a few token
purchases from U.S. firms, the "big ticket" orders will still go to the
17. In late December 1983, the author visited NTT and discussed its U.S. procurement
policies with high ranking NTT officials including the director of the International Procure-
ment Department. He expressed a desire to have more U.S. participation in NTT
procurement.
18. High Technology Gateway: Foreigners Demand a Piece of NTTs $3 Billion Market,
Bus. WK., Aug. 9, 1982, at 43.
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Den-den family. This may be true. NTT's policy is still to restrict
its communication satellite development to domestic firms. United
States central office telephone switch manufacturers also question
NTT's sincerity. However Americans knowledgeable about Japa-
nese ways of doing business claim American companies can sell to
NTT if they will make the effort. "A lot of American companies
don't do the groundwork and are not willing to modify their equip-
ment to meet NTT standards," says a Tokyo-based representative
for a U.S. company which has been successful in selling to the
Japanese. 19
D. Americans Are Now Selling to NIT
Businesses which have made the effort have been rewarded.
Plantronics, Inc., a small California corporation, received NTT
approval to sell its headsets to Japanese companies three months
after the new procurement agreement was signed. Plantronics had
been trying to enter the Japanese headset market for ten years.
Within one month after the initial breakthrough, Plantronics
obtained NTT approval for a second generation version of its
original product. It is now firmly established in the Japanese
telecommunications market.
For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1983, twenty-one U.S. firms
were awarded NTT contracts for a total of $40 million. Major
contracts include $9 million to Motorola for pocket pagers, $5
million to ITT for digital PABX and $3.5 million to AT&T for
satellite echo-cancellers. Other smaller orders were placed with
U.S. companies for such products as LSI manufacturing
equipment, intelligent multiplexer, 200mm flexible disk cartridges
and CCP cable connector equipment.
Compared to NTT's $3.2 billion annual procurement, $40 million
sales by U.S. firms is indeed a "drop in the bucket." But given the
fact that three years ago NTT's U.S. purchases were almost zero, it
represents an opportunity which U.S. companies previously did
not have. NTT purchases from foreign firms from April 1983 to
September 1983 were $28 million, up 60% over purchases for the
same period in 1982. Total foreign purchases for FY 1984 are
estimated at $140 million. Clearly that represents a change.
19. See id
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V. TECHNOPOLIS
A. Background
In 1980 the Ministry of International Trade & Industry (MITI)
coined the word "technopolis" and announced plans to build two
or three such technopolises in Japan. A technopolis - a
combination of the English word "technology" and the ancient
Greek word for a city-state, "polis" - is to be an industrial
complex consisting of three interlocking components:
1. An industrial unit - composed of factories, distribution
centers and other business facilities;
2. An academic group - composed of universities, public
research and development institutions; and
3. Living areas - to house managers, teachers, engineers,
scientists and their families.
Each technopolis is to be located next to a "mother city" with a
population of 200,000 or more, and close enough to an airport
or railway station to permit a round trip to one of the major
cities of Tokyo, Osaka or Nagoya within one day. The main
features of the technopolises are to be completed by 1990, with
further development continuing into the 1990's. The
distinguishing feature of the technopolises is that they will be
built around advanced technology industries rather than
massive steel and concrete manufacturing complexes.
When MITI's plans were announced, 40 of Japan's 47
prefectures instantly opted to host such high-tech towns. The
lobbying was so intense that MITI revised its original plans
and increased the number of planned technopolises to
nineteen. Several of them are now close to completion. All are
receiving substantial central and prefectural government
support. The program is proceeding much faster than initially
thought possible.
B. Implication for U.S. Businesses
In tune with MITI and the central governments' new found
interest in welcoming foreign investors to Japan, the prefectural
governments with technopolises in their prefectures are vying with
one another to attract foreign investors. Several have dispatched
teams of government and investment promoters to visit U.S. high-
tech centers in hopes of attracting them to their particular
technopolis. MITI has established an Industrial Location
Guidance Division to handle inquiries from foreign companies.
(Vol, 7
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This office works with MITI's Industrial Relocation Division and
the technopolises' coordinating offices established in each
technopolis' parent prefecture.
The Japan Development Bank has shown a direct interest in the
technopolis concept. This is very important in a country like
Japan where government involvement in any project almost
guarantees its success. Although the Bank may not provide all the
funding for a particular foreign project, its involvement lends the
government's stamp of approval and is a strong incentive for
private banks to participate.
Materials Research Corporation, a New York based semi-
conductor manufacturer, was interested in opening a plant in the
Oita Prefecture, one of the technopolis sites. Sheldon Weinig,
Material Research's president, said of the project, "[w]e are being
helped tremendously by the Japanese government." Skeptical at
first, Mr. Weinig conferred with United States Ambassador to
Japan Mike Mansfield. "I told Ambassador Mansfield that I was
afraid we were being set up." He replied, "If you're being set up,
enjoy it." Materials Research opened its plant in Oita last year,
ahead of schedule.2'
Fairchild Cameras and Instrument Corporation has announced a
wholly-owned venture to produce integrated circuits (ICs) in
Kumamoto, Kyushu, the technopolis known as Japan's "Silicon
Island." Union Carbide also is establishing a wholly-owned
venture to produce chemicals in another technopolis in the
prefecture of Hyogo.
MITI has earmarked Y230 million of its annual budget for the
semipublic Japan External Trade Relations Organization
(JETRO) to develop "come to Japan" programs. Fifty
investments by foreign firms in Japan have been made in the past
two years. One-third of these were in the high-tech field.
VI. NEW AND EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES
FOR U.S. BUSINESSES
For the past 10 to 15 years U.S. businesses seeking to enter the Japa-
nese market have been saying, "[a]ll we want from the Japanese is a
chance to compete with them on an equal basis." Liberalization of
restrictive laws, changes in official attitudes and the trend toward inter-
nationalization of the economy significantly accomplishes that goal. It
20. See Wall St. J., May 12, 1982, at 24, coL 3.
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does not give U.S. businesses a competitive advantage. It only frees
them to compete in what has been termed the worlds' most competitive
market. The extent to which U.S. businesses will succeed in that mar-
ket will depend on the strength of their products and services and their
marketing power.
A. The Consumer Market
On the basis of past successes, it is possible to select certain types
of products, services, and business opportunities that are likely to
do well in Japan. The consumer market is the most dynamic.
Products for that market require the most careful selection before
entry, and constant nurturing after entry. The reason is obvious-
this is the area where national customs and cultural differences are
most pronounced.
The earlier entrants into the consumer market were well-known
brands manufactured by well-known companies. The following
table gives some examples:
U.S. Products With Significant Market Share in Japan2l
Approximate Market
Product Brand/Company Share (%)
Safety razors Schick 70
Soft drinks Coca Cola 60
Paper diapers (Pampers) Procter & Gamble 50
Heat resistant cookware Coming Glass 30
Tomato juice Del Monte 30
Wax Johnson & Johnson 30
Tissue paper Kleenex 20
Photographic film Kodak 20
This led to the conclusion that a good product must be one that
was overwhelmingly successful in the United States. Although in
the early days this may have been the case, it is no longer true.
Over 90% of Japanese consider themselves "middle class" and
shop accordingly. Over four million travel overseas each year and
are thereby exposed to foreign goods not available in Japan. This
is particularly true of the under thirty age group. So the range and
acceptability of products in Japan is widening. This had led to
21. Source: Manufactured Import Promotion Organization (MIPRO), May 1982.
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what one study calls "the softening of product image."'" The Jap-
anese no longer simply buy foreign products because they have
gained acceptance in their country of origin. "People are now
looking," the study points out, "for products that didn't previously
exist in Japan, products clearly differentiated from other goods
that can meet customer's ranging needs." 23
This provides an opportunity for even fairly new U.S. companies
with a high quality, unique product to market it in Japan. Among
the younger consumers trendy apparel, cosmetics, tennis wear, ski
wear, leotards and body building equipment are considered good
prospects. These younger people are much more likely than their
older relations to buy products that are distinctively American and
stand out as such. They are less inhibited. If the product has wide
appeal among younger generation Americans, chances are it will
have a strong appeal among Japanese in the same age group.
Additional insight into the extent to which aggressive salesman-
ship by U.S. companies has penetrated the Japanese consumer
product market is provided by the Christian Science Monitor.
That publication reports that almost 81% of Japanese surveyed
made extensive purchases of foreign food-stuffs, while 67% re-
ported purchasing clothing, 54% household articles, 40% sporting
equipment and 14% reported purchasing foreign-made furniture.
The enormous success of U.S. fast food chains has become legen-
dary, with McDonald's sales in Japan topping $304 million in
1983. Denny's restaurants have become so popular that many Jap-
anese do not even think of them as American. "Japan's postwar
'baby boom' generation, in fact, is hooked on hamburgers and
french fries, Shakey's pizzas, Coca Cola and Baskins Robbins ice
cream," says the Monitor. A typical Japanese golfer dons
Slazenger sports wear and uses Wilson clubs to hit Dunlop balls.
The Japanese also consume large quantities of imported perfumes,
whiskey, tableware, fruits, chocolates, jam, sports equipment and
cosmetics. (As reported in Washington-International Commu-
nications, December 5, 1983.)
B. The High-Tech and Capital Goods Market
The market for production materials, high-tech and capital goods
is somewhat more sophisticated than the consumers' goods market.
Here the U.S. businesses may be dealing in areas in which the
22. MANUFACTURED IMPORT PROMOTION ORGANIZATION, SEING TO JAPAN, FROM
A TO Z (1983).
23. Id
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Japanese excel. In this category product strength is all important.
The U.S. product must have some quality that clearly puts it ahead
of Japanese products in the same field. It should have a significant
advantage over competing Japanese products in some respect, be it
basic technology, know-how or production technique, or it should
fall into a category constituting a market that is economically too
small to interest a domestic Japanese manufacturer.
A U.S. product that satisfied most of those criteria was snow-
making machinery. Skiing has become quite popular in Japan,
but scant snowfalls coming late in the season plagued the ski
resorts. Japanese manufacturers did not have the technology or
the large domestic market for snow-making equipment. U.S.
manufacturers have both and imported U.S. snow-making
equipment has been doing quite well in Japan. Another example
is U.S.-manufactured automatic pinsetting machinery which sold
quite well during a big bowling boom.
Even with technologies presumed to be wholly dominated by the
Japanese, energetic U.S. firms find customers in Japan. Few areas
are more dominated by Japanese manufacturers than the robotics
market. Yet the Pittsburgh-based American Robot Corporation
recently delivered the first of several robots to Sony Corporation
for use in electronics assembly. The U.S. firm said it hoped to
capture up to 5% of the Japanese market in the next few years. (As
reported by Washington-International Communications,
December 5, 1983.)
The McKinsey study listed four basic characteristics, one or more
of which are vital preconditions for the successful entry of
products into the Japanese market. These are products which
(a) are resource driven, (b) have a definite technological lead,
(c) are "new" to Japan, or, (d) fit a special niche. The commercial
attache's office of the United States Embassy in Tokyo listed
several product areas considered to have excellent possibilities, all






6. Construction related machinery;
7. Cryogenic equipment and materials;
8. Electronic components;
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9. Graphic arts equipment.
C. The Service Market
The Japanese economy is noticeably shifting from an era of
expanding industrialization to one of service-oriented businesses.
Three separate studies by the office of the Prime Minister reveal
that service accounted for 34% of total consumption in 1982, as
compared with 26.9% in 1979. (Focus Japan, August 1983.)
Rising levels of income, the increasing popularity of the five-day
work week and housewives taking on part-time jobs, give the
Japanese more leisure time and more disposable income.
Consumer-oriented services are definitely on the increase.
The new internationalized climate coupled with basic changes in
customer behavior is opening up a whole new range of services to
U.S. investors. Many of these are services that did not previously
exist in Japan. Financial services are a good example.
Under the New Bank Law of 1982 foreign banks are now able to
participate in Japan's special bonds markets and issue their own
certificates of deposit. Allstate Insurance recently announced the
establishment of its wholly-owned operation in Japan. Cancer
insurance, which previously did not exist in Japan, is now
available through the American Family Life Insurance Company.
These types of services should be particularly attractive to U.S.
investors who can enter the market with a distinct advantage.
They have the kind of experience in the United States which is
transferable to Japan, and since these services are new to Japan,
there is no significant competition to overcome.
Currently, there is a definite need for computer software services.
In this area Japan lags far behind the United States. A significant
percentage of CAD/CAM systems used in Japan are of U.S.
origin.
VII. IMPORTANCE OF PROPER MARKET ENTRY
A. Persons experienced in Japanese ways of doing business agree that
just as important as the product or service is the way it is
introduced. U.S. products or services attract high visibility. The
fact that a particular U.S. company is entering the market rapidly
becomes known within the industry. Japan is a place where things
must be done right the first time. One seldom has a second chance.
"Americans have many advantages in competing with the
Japanese," says a prominent U.S. executive. Ways Some U.S.
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Firms Crack Japan's Market, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT (Aug.
29, 1983). Murray Eisner, President of Shaeffer Eaton Division of
Textron and one who has had considerable marketing experience
in Japan, gives this advice:
We must overcome our inferiority complex that the
Japanese and other foreign manufacturers are taking our
livelihood away from us. One advantage many
American firms have is more style and innovation than
most Japanese companies do. If you have a quality
product that stands out from the crowd, you have a good
chance of selling in Japan. . . you have to understand
consumers' expectations . . . [and] you have to be
competitive...
Mr. Eisner, however, adds this important cautionary note:
I think American companies that can legitimately export
have not done their homework thoroughly. They haven't
found the right people to get distribution for their
products. You can't just go into a country and say,
'Here's my soap' or 'my pen' or 'my refrigerator', and
start selling it; you've got to study in great depth the
mentality of the market and the competitive
environment.
B. Planning the Market Entry
With most of the inhibiting restrictions now lifted, many different
market entry methods are open to U.S. businesses. They range
from licensing the product to establishing a wholly-owned foreign
subsidiary.
The most successful U.S. companies in Japan are those that have
systematically planned their entry. Information gathering is the
first and perhaps the most important phase.
The information gathering process should focus on two factors:
1. The main characteristics and advantages that the product,
service or company has, at the time of entry, that formed the
basis for the decision to do business in Japan.
2. The most efficacious mode of entering the market, and how to
conduct business in response to the changing conditions that
are sure to develop after the initial entry.24
Based on this information, the company will design its strategy.
24. See McKINSEY study, supra note 1.
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The major components of that strategy should consist of the
following:
1. Product suitability - Is the product saleable in Japan? This is
basic market analysis, well-developed in the United States,
applied to the Japanese market. This phase should take into
consideration all of the factors discussed in section VI "New
and Emerging Opportunities for U.S. Businesses."
2. Competition - an analysis of the competition is the next step.
At a minimum, such factors as potential market share, industry
practice, pricing policies and industrial concentration should
be considered.
3. Mode of Entry - the two phases of information gathering
discussed above should prepare the U.S. company for the most
important decision it must make - the proper method of
entry. There are a number of alternatives with varying
implications based on the company's intentions in Japan.
At opposite ends of the spectrum, depending on the product,
are licensing and the establishment of a wholly-owned
company. For a product with a short life cycle, where
management is more interested in short-term profits than in
establishing a long-term presence in Japan, a licensing
arrangement is best. Where management is interested in
establishing a permanent presence in Japan, its ultimate goal
should be the establishment of a wholly-owned subsidiary.
The decision of which mode of entry to pursue is important
because it commits the company to a course of action which
cannot be easily reversed. Some companies have no long-term
interest in Japan. For those that do, the development of a
long-term strategy beginning with the initial entry and
incorporating a plan for coping with changing conditions once
in the market, is vital. It is the one area where the level of
commitment in time, effort and money ultimately pays
dividends.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The positive attitude of the Japanese government with respect to direct
investment of foreign capital, the lending policies of the Japan Devel-
opment Bank, NTT's open invitation to U.S. suppliers and the pro-
grams by the various technopolises to lure foreign investors into Japan
are all evidence that there is currently in Japan a favorable climate for
U.S. investment in Japan. The statistics support this conclusion.
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The highest recorded direct investment volume by foreign businesses
was $524 million in fiscal 1979. For the period April through Decem-
ber 1982, direct investments had already reached $624 million. This
represents a 220% increase over the same period of the previous year.
The Japan Development Bank reported that as of November 1983 it
had received 17 requests for loans from U.S. affiliated firms, 87% of
which were from high-tech manufacturers of integrated circuits,
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. The Bank plans to increase its
budget for foreign loans to Y10 billion. Clearly the obstacles to invest-
ment in Japan have been substantially removed.
The Japanese market is no longer the closed market it once was. It is a
lively, vibrant and growing market which U.S. companies can now
enter. Once in the market, however, competition is formidable. The
need for thorough preparation before entering is an absolute necessity,
as is a strong commitment and perseverance after entry. Many U.S.
companies already in the market are prospering, some better than their
Japanese counterparts. But there is ample room for further penetration
by U.S. companies with quality products, innovative services and the
right approach.
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